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Abstract. Process roles are used to structure complex engineering processes in 
single systems development for many years. Typically, each role has specific re-
sponsibilities from which certain information demands originate. In the engineer-
ing of variable software, role-specific information demands affect variability in-
formation. To control the access to the variability information, we suggest using 
the concepts of an explicit access control model. We integrate an access control 
model and a variability modeling language on a conceptual level. Additionally, 
we extend the variability modeling language by formally defined operations. 
Based on this extension, we propose a formal integration of an access control 
model and the variability modeling language. Our solution allows to explicitly 
define access control to variability information on a formal basis. 
Keywords: variability management, role-based access control, viewpoint- 
oriented, variability modeling 
1 Introduction 
Process-roles (or short: roles) are used to structure complex engineering processes of 
single systems (cf. [1, 2]). Thus, role-specific responsibilities of the engineering process 
are managed. Based on these responsibilities, role-specific information demands w.r.t. 
to software engineering artifacts exist. These information demands are represented in 
role-specific information sets, containing a subset of engineering artifacts. Information 
sets are subject to concurrency conflicts because they can overlap. Not every role has 
the same permissions on the elements of an information set, so explicitly controlling 
the access to information sets is an accepted best practice to avoid such conflicts. 
Hence, established access control models are applied to the engineering artifacts. In this 
setting two needs for structuring an engineering process can be formulated: Information 
sets need to be defined to meet the information demands of roles (Need 1); Permissions 
on elements and operations of information sets need to be managed (Need 2) 
Defining and managing information sets as well as controlling the access to their 
elements is also relevant in the engineering of variable software that is used today (cf. 
[3, 4]). Variable software enables different software products with different features, 
sharing a common core. Such software is typically developed for multiple markets and 
a heterogenic stakeholder base. In this setting, potential mutually exclusive stakeholder 
demands need to be considered. Thus, the first class concept of variability (cf. [3]) is 
used to explicitly document this crosscutting property in separate models. Variability 
is understood as a separate layer of information further increasing the complexity of an 
engineering process. Hence, variability management is key for engineering variable 
software. Assuming that variability information can be managed the same way as en-
gineering artifacts, we understand that role-specific information sets and permissions 
for operations on role-specific information sets need to be specified.  
To define information sets on the variability information layer, variability models 
need to be taken into account. Ways to generally define information sets on variability 
models were studied in the literature. CZARNECKI et al. [5] use different stages to enable 
a staged configuration of variability. Each stage represents a subset of variability infor-
mation. MANNION et al. [6] propose stakeholder-specific subsets of a master variability 
model to represent different information sets. ACHER et al. [7] and HUBAUX et al. [8] 
realize information sets on variability models as views by projections. Hence, these 
approaches address Need 1 and can be used to structure the variability information in 
an engineering process. These works do not focus on controlling the access to the ele-
ments of variability information sets. Therefore, these approaches cannot be applied in 
an engineering process that requires controlling the access to elements of variability 
information sets without modification. Consequently, Need 2 is not addressed. There-
fore, we address the problem that the sole use of views (variability information sets) is 
not sufficient to realize access control on variability models.  
Our contribution enables the application of access control concepts directly on Or-
thogonal Variability Model (OVM, [3]) instances. Therefore, we first integrate the 
Role-based Access Control Model (RBAC, [9]) and OVM on a conceptual level. Based 
on this conceptual integration, we extend the OVM by formally defined operations. 
This extension allows the assignment of permissions on the operations applicable to 
OVM elements. These permissions can be defined in an explicit access control model 
instance that is independent of the OVM. Because the proposed integration is based on 
OVM element and operation level, the results of our work can be used to seamlessly 
apply the concepts of existing approaches for defining information sets on variability 
information (e.g. [5, 6, 7, 8]) with our approach. The extension of OVM and the inte-
gration of RBAC and OVM are necessary steps to address Need 2. 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present the fundamentals of our 
approach. Section 3 describes the ontology and requirements of our approach. Section 
4 integrates RBAC and OVM and the viewpoint concept. In Section 5, we present an 
application example. Related work is presented in Section 6. Conclusion and future 
work are presented in Section 7.  
2 Fundamentals 
Modeling Variability with Orthogonal Variability Model (OVM). The concept of 
variability defines a first class concept that needs to be documented explicitly in a sep-
arate variability model (cf. [3, 4]). Its fundamental ontological concepts are variability 
subject and variability object. The variability subject is defined as a variable item of the 
real world or a variable property of such an item (e.g., car paint). Accordingly, the 
variability object is defined as a particular instance of a variability subject (e.g., red 
paint, cf. [3]). These two concepts are supported by multiple relationships between var-
iability subjects and variability objects, such as optional, mandatory, or alternative 
group dependencies. Constraints between variability subjects and variability objects are 
used to express requires- or excludes- relationships. These concepts can be instantiated 
by different variability modeling languages (VML). The OVM documents variability 
information of variable software. OVM instantiates the concept variability subject and 
variability object as variation point and variant. The OVM supports uni-directional re-
quires and bi-directional excludes concerns. Dependencies that express an optional or 
mandatory relation between a variation point and a variant are defined, as well as alter-
native groups (concrete Syntax: Fig. 1). Variants are always part of a variability de-
pendency and are related to a variation point. 
 
Fig. 1. OVM Concrete Syntax (cf. [3]) 
Role-based Access Control (RBAC). RBAC is an access control model standardized 
in ANSI/INCITS Std. 359-2004 [9]. This access control model consists of multiple sets. 
The core elements of RBAC are the sets USERS, ROLES, OBJECTS, OPERATIONS, 
and PERMISSIONS. In RBAC, a user is defined as a human being. A role is a job 
function within an organization and can hence be understood as a process role. Mem-
bers of the set OBJECTS are defined as resources that are subject to access control. 
Elements of OPERATIONS are defined as executable images of a program that execute 
a function for the user who invoked the operation. A permission is defined as an ap-
proval to perform an operation on an object that is subject to access control. Roles are 
assigned to users (UA ⊆ U × R). Permissions are assigned to roles (PA ⊆ P × R). The 
RBAC reference model supports multiple extensions, such as role hierarchies and sep-
aration of duty. Fig. 2 shows the conceptual relations between the RBAC elements.  
 
Fig. 2. Role-Based Access Control Conceptual Model (based on [9]) 
IEEE Std. 42010-based Viewpoints. The IEEE Std. 42010 [10] provides a conceptual 
framework for defining viewpoints. These viewpoints allow a separation of concerns 
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in an architectural description. Concerns are the core concept of viewpoint definitions, 
describing the interest of stakeholders in the architecture of the software under devel-
opment (SUD). A viewpoint is a specification supporting the structured derivation of 
one view on a SUD. Hence, multiple viewpoints are required to fully describe the ar-
chitecture of such software. 
3 Ontological Assumptions and Requirements of the Approach 
Based on the concepts explained in Section 2, we describe the interplay of the funda-
mentals on an ontological level. We understand that in variability management, an ac-
cess control model must integrate with existing concepts such as process roles (or short: 
roles), viewpoints and the concepts provided by a variability modeling language. Fig. 
3 shows the ontology for integrating OVM, RBAC and Viewpoint-oriented concepts. 
 
Fig. 3. Ontology for RBAC in Viewpoint-oriented Variability Management 
Roles need to be recognized, because they are essential to established software process 
models (cf. [1]). Hence, roles are the connective element of our ontology. Roles have 
multiple diverging permissions, allowing them to execute certain operations on differ-
ent objects. These role-specific permissions are based on the responsibilities that are 
assigned to a role, whereas the assignment of responsibilities is organized in the soft-
ware process model. Roles have specific concerns that are documented in viewpoints. 
Based on the viewpoints, views can be derived that contain a role-specific information 
set (subset) of the complete set of variability information.  
Roles are not disjunctive entities with regards to their information demands. Hence, 
information demands may be conflicting. This situation is known in the engineering of 
single systems but is commonly understood in the engineering of variable software.  
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Hence, we derive the following requirements for our approach:  
• A variability model needs to be conceptually specified.      (R1) 
• The operations of a variability model need to be specified conceptually.    (R2) 
• Access to variability information needs to be explicitly controlled.     (R3) 
• Access control needs to fine granular.         (R4) 
• Permissions need to be assigned to process-roles.       (R5) 
The requirement R1 states that the elements of a variability model and the relations 
among them need to be made explicit in a conceptual model. Such a conceptual model 
can be understood as a meta-model (cf. [3]). Accordingly, requirement R2 states that 
the operations of a variability model need to be defined on the same level as the ele-
ments. The requirement R3 states that access to variability information needs to be ex-
plicitly controlled, for instance by an access control model. The requirement R4 states 
that access rights need to be specifiable on an artifact element level. To realize a fine 
granular access control, the operations manipulating elements of an artifact need to be 
recognized as well.  
Requirement R4 implies that the operations on elements of a VML and the elements 
themselves need to be formally specified. Hence, the requirements R6 and R7 can be 
formulated.  
• The elements of a VML need to be formally specified.       (R6) 
• The operations of a VML need to be formally specified.       (R7) 
Addressing requirement R6 and R7 is language-specific. For feature models, multiple 
works already addressed this topic (cf. [11, 12, 13, 14]). In contrast, solely the elements 
of the OVM are defined by the abstract syntax (R1, [3]). The semantics of the elements 
of the OVM are defined in METZGER et al. [15]. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, 
operations that manipulate an OVM are not yet formally specified.  
The aforementioned requirements R3 – R7 aim at the integration of a variability 
model and an explicit access control model. In this setting, the need for a concept that 
is capable of defining role-specific information sets is also present, which can be for-
mulated as requirement R8: 
• An access controlled VML needs to be integrated with a viewpoint concept.     (R8) 
4 Access Control for Variability Information  
In our experience, a holistic approach for variability management needs to regard three 
distinct layers. The first layer contains the variability information that is explicitly doc-
umented by use of a variability model. In the second layer, the relationships between 
the variability model and the base-artifacts of the engineering process are managed. 
The third layer contains all base-artifacts (e.g. requirements, components, classes, test 
cases) that can be related to variability information. In this paper, we regard the first 
layer in such a holistic approach towards variability management in order to integrate 
access control and variability modeling on a formally sound basis. Because RBAC is 
specified in Z, we also chose Z [16] in order to gain a sound integration of the concepts. 
Fig. 4 shows the hierarchical structure and the corresponding parts of our solution. 
 
Fig. 4. Overview of the Structure of the Solution Approach 
Each solution part addresses certain requirements stated in Section 3. Our solution con-
sists of five parts. The first part “OVM Meta Model” has already been published and 
provides the basis for the solution presented in this paper. We describe the remaining 
solution parts in detail in the following sections. 
• Already existing OVM meta model ( R1) (Section 2) 
• Extended OVM meta model ( R2) (Section 4.1) 
• Z-specification of the extended OVM ( R6, R7) (Section 4.2) 
• Integration of OVM and RBAC ( R3, R4, R5)  (Section 4.3) 
• Integration with viewpoint concept ( R8) (Section 4.4) 
4.1 Extended OVM Meta Model  
The OVM meta-model is presented in (cf. [3]). This conceptual model describes the 
elements of an OVM model instance as the abstract meta-classes Variation Point, Var-
iant, Variability Dependency, and multiple constraint dependencies. Thereby, the ab-
stract syntax of the OVM is described. In order to represent operations that can be ap-
plied to OVM elements, the original OVM meta-model was extended by abstract meta-
class OVM Operations (cf. Fig. 8, Extended OVM Meta Model). An OVM operation 
can operate on the meta-classes Variation Point, Variant, Variability Dependency, and 
the constraint dependencies but is not limited to one element kind. By introducing OVM 
operations on the conceptual level, we address requirement R2. 
4.2 OVM Z-Specification  
OVM cannot be integrated with RBAC without formally defining operations for this 
variability modeling language. As RBAC is specified in Z, the OVM and the operations 
on concrete OVMs need to be defined in Z as well. The formal semantics of the OVM 
are presented in [15]. To specify operations that can be executed on a concrete OVM, 
we describe ‘VP’ and ‘V’ as the set of all possible variation points and variants. We 
further assume that the total amount of elements of V is equal to amount of integer 
numbers (|V| ≤ |ℕ|). Furthermore, we assume the total amount of variation points to be 
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less or equal to the total amount of variants. Hence, the |VP| ≤ |V| ≤ |ℕ| is considered as 
always fulfilled. Each element of ‘V’ and ‘VP’ has a unique name. In a Z-based spec-
ification the sets ‘VP’ and ‘V’ can be represented as global variables. Because of the 
conceptual differences between variation points and variants, constraints need to be 
defined on a fine granular level.  
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 OVM_Elements      
MAN_VP, OPT_VP: ℙ VP 
VARIANT: ℙ V 
 
∀ x, y: VP ⦁ x ∈ MAN_VP ⇒ x ∉ OPT_VP ∧ 
y ∈ OPT_VP ⇒ y ∉ MAN_VP 
 OVM_Dependencies  
MAN, OPT: V → VP 
ALTGROUP: (ℙ1 V×(ℕ×ℕ)) → VP 
 
∀ x, y: (V × VP) ⦁ x ∈ MAN ⇒ x ∉ OPT ∧ 
 y ∈ OPT⇒ y ∉ MAN 
∃ x:VP; v: ℙ1 V; w: V; m,n:ℕ | m ≤ n ≤ #v ∧  
w ∈ v ⇒ (w ↦ x) ∉ MAN ∧ (w ↦ x) ∉ OPT 
⦁ (v ↦ (m↦n)↦ x) ∈ ALTGROUP 
 
Fig. 5. Z-schemata OVM_Elements and OVM Dependencies 
The Z-schema “OVM_Elements” declares three power sets (denoted by ℙ, cf. Fig. 5, 
lines 2, and 3) representing concrete mandatory and optional variation points, as well 
as concrete variants of an OVM model. The properties of these sets are defined in the 
lines 5 - 10. In Fig. 5, the sets share the property that their elements are unique. Three 
sets are declared in the first 2 lines of the schema “OVM_Dependencies”. These sets 
represent the different variability dependencies (cf. OVM meta model, [3]) as surjective 
functions. The set ‘ALTGROUP’ describes concrete alternative groups consisting of 
two or more variants, as well as a minimal and a maximal cardinality that are related to 
a variation point (cf. Fig. 1). Each variant of an alternative group must not be a member 
of any other variability dependency (lines 7 - 9). The Z-schema “OVM_Constraints” 
represents the possible combinations of constraints between variation points and vari-
ants as separate sets (Fig. 6). Each set has a specified type in order to express the map-
ping of the elements of the set. Furthermore, there are no subset relations defined for 
type compatible constraint sets. Hence, we understand that elements of one constraint 
set cannot be member of another constraint set, even if these sets are type compatible. 
For instance, elements of the set ‘EXCLUDES_V_V’ can be described as follows: Let 
v1, v2, v3, and v4 be elements of type V. Furthermore, v1, v2, v3, and v4 are elements of 
‘VARIANT’ (cf. Z-schema “OVM_Elements”). If there exists one excludes constraint 
between each variant pair (v1, v2) and (v3, v4), one has ‘EXCLUDES_V_V’ = {v1 ↦ v2, 
v2 ↦ v1, v3 ↦ v4, v4 ↦ v3}.  
Fig. 6. Z-schemata OVM_Constraints, OVM_Model, add_Variation_Point 
1 
2 
3 
 
4 
5 
6 
 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
 OVM_Constraints                 
EXCLUDES_V_V: V ↔ V 
EXCLUDES_V_VP: V ↔ VP 
 
EXCLUDES_VP_V: VP ↔ V 
EXCLUDES_VP_VP: VP ↔ VP 
REQUIRES_V_V: V ↔ V 
 
REQUIRES_V_VP: V ↔ VP 
REQUIRES_VP_V: VP ↔ V 
REQUIRES_VP_VP: VP ↔ VP 
 
 add_Variation_Point    
ΔOVM_Elements 
addManVP!: VP → ℙ1 VP 
x?:VP 
 
x? ∉ MAN_VP ∧ x? ∉ OPT_VP ∧ MAN_VP ⊂ 
(MAN_VP ∪ {x?}) ∧ addManVP!(x?) = 
MAN_VP ∪ {x?} 
 
 
 OVM_Model     
ΞOVM_Elements 
ΞOVM_Dependencies 
ΞOVM_Constraints 
 
 
It is important to note that the elements of ‘EXCLUDES_V_V’, (v1, v2) and (v2, v1) are 
considered different. Furthermore, both elements are part of this excludes set, because 
excludes is a bi-directional constraint. For the sake of brevity, we omitted the explicit 
specification of uniqueness of the elements of each constraint set. The Z-schema 
“add_Variation_Point” specifies the operations addManVP (cf. Fig. 6). This operation 
takes a mandatory variation point as input and  adds this variation point to an OVM 
model by uniting the existing set ‘MAN_VP’ with the set representation of the input 
parameter vp. The lines 5 - 7 of Fig. 6 state the properties that need to be fulfilled for 
these operations. Because of the uniqueness of elements in an OVM model, we explic-
itly state that the variation point to be added must not already be contained in the set 
‘MAN_VP’. Furthermore, we explicitly state that the unmodified set ‘MAN_VP’ is a 
proper subset of its modified version. The same operation can be defined to add optional 
variation points but was omitted for the sake of brevity in this paper. The Z-schema 
“OVM_Model” (Fig. 6) represents an OVM model by combining the aforementioned 
schemata. Hence, there are no further declarations or properties specified as they are 
specified in the corresponding schemata. No modifications to the sets of the referenced 
schemata are specified in “OVM_Model”. To explicitly denote that the states of the 
referenced schemata are not changed, they are prefixed with the symbol Ξ. The Z-
schema “remove_Variation_Point” specifies an operation that can be used to remove a 
variation point from the set ‘MAN_VP’. Thus, the properties that must be satisfied are 
made explicit in the lines 7 - 13 in Fig. 7 for the operation removeManVP. This opera-
tion requires a variation point as input and removes it from the set ‘MAN_VP’, if and 
only if the variation point to be removed is an element of ‘MAN_VP’ and is not part of 
a constraint relation. Furthermore, the variation point to be removed must not be part 
of a variability dependency. The same operation can be defined to remove elements of 
the set ‘OPT_VP’. This operation shares the same properties as the operation re-
moveManVP. Due to space limitations, we present an excerpt of the operations. Never-
theless, this excerpt addresses the requirements R6 and R7.  
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 remove_Variation_Point  
ΔOVM_Elements 
ΞOVM_Dependencies 
ΞOVM_Constraints 
removeManVP!: VP → ℙ VP 
x?:VP 
∀ y:VP; v: V; m,n : ℕ; w:ℙ V | x? ≠ y ∧ m ≤ n ≤ #w ∧ x? ∈ MAN_VP ∧  
((w ↦ (m↦n)) ↦ x?)  ∉ ALTGROUP ∧ (v ↦ x?) ∉ MAN ∧ (v ↦ x?) ∉ OPT ∧  
(x? ↦ y) ∉ EXCLUDES_VP_VP ∧ (y ↦ x?) ∉ EXCLUDES_VP_VP ∧  
(x? ↦ y) ∉ REQUIRES_VP_VP ∧ (y ↦ x?) ∉ REQUIRES_VP_VP ∧  
(v ↦ x?) ∉ EXCLUDES_V_VP ∧ (x? ↦ v) ∉ EXCLUDES_VP_V ∧  
(v ↦ x?) ∉ REQUIRES_V_VP ∧ (x? ↦ v) ∉ REQUIRES_VP_V ⦁  
removeManVP!(x?)= MAN_VP ∖ {x?} 
 
 
Fig. 7. Z-schema remove_Variation_Point 
4.3 Access Controlled OVM Meta Model 
OVM and RBAC can be integrated on a conceptual level. This integration is based on 
the ontology (Section 3) and the extended OVM meta-model (cf. Fig. 8). Key to the 
proposed integration of RBAC and OVM is the understanding of Information Set and 
Variability Information as specializations of Object (cf. Fig. 8). Moreover, Variability 
Information is in a specialization relation to Operations. Because of these specialization 
relations, Information Set and Variability Information are manageable by the concepts 
of RBAC. OVM Operations are in a specialization relation to Variability Information 
Operations (cf. Fig. 8). Because of the inheritance hierarchy, OVM Operations are 
RBAC Operations. The meta-classes Variation Point, Variant, Variability Dependency, 
and the different constraint dependencies are also understood as specializations of Var-
iability Information. Because of the inheritance hierarchy these meta-classes are spe-
cializations of Object (cf. Fig. 8). This implies that the OVM meta-classes are either 
specializations of the Object or Operations. Consequently, OVM operations and the 
other OVM meta-classes can be managed using RBAC. Because of these relationships, 
OVM and RBAC are understood as conceptually integrated.  
 
Fig. 8. Extended OVM Meta Model and integrated with RBAC 
Integrating OVM and RBAC on the level of their Z-specifications, the elements and 
operations of the OVM Z-specification need to be related to their corresponding ele-
ments of the RBAC Z-specification. From this, it follows that we consider the sets of 
mandatory and optional variation points (cf. Fig. 5, Z-schema “OVM_Element”) as 
disjoint proper subsets of the RBAC set OBJECTS. The same holds true for the sets 
defined in the Z-schema “OVM_Dependencies” (cf. Fig. 5), and “OVM_Constraints” 
(cf. Fig. 6). We integrate the previously defined operations in the same way by defining 
a proper subset relation between the operations addManVP (cf. Fig. 6), removeManVP 
(cf. Fig. 7) and the RBAC set ‘OPERATIONS’. Hence, we consider the requirements 
R3, R4, and R5 addressed.  
4.4 Access Controlled OVM Meta Model with Viewpoint-Concept 
The conceptual integration of viewpoints/views and role-based access control is based 
on our ontology (Section 3). The ontology specifies the conceptual relation of a role-
specific view and information set as an aggregation (cf. Section 3).  Because of the spe-
cialization, the relation between information set and Object (RBAC) information set is 
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considered integrated with RBAC. The same holds true for pieces of variability infor-
mation that are the elements of a concrete information set. For this reason, we consider 
OVM and RBAC conceptually integrated with the viewpoint/view concept.  
Defining role-specific views on the level of the Z-specifications is inherently real-
ized by the assignment of permissions to roles. Because each permission consists of an 
object and an operation (cf. Fig. 2), views can be realised by making use of the RBAC 
operation RolePermissions. This operation is part of the RBAC [9] and requires a role 
as input parameter. If and only if the role is known, the objects and operations that are 
assigned to a role are returned. From this, it follows that the operation RolePermissions 
returns a subset of information, which in our case is an information set containing a 
role-specific subset of variability information. Based on the above explanations we con-
sider requirement R8 addressed.  
5 Application of our Approach 
To illustrate our approach, we use the example of a product line from the medical do-
main published by Acher et al. [7]. 
5.1 OVM Example – Variability of Imaging Registration Service 
Fig. 9 depicts an excerpt of the variability of the Medical Imaging Registration Service 
(or short: Imaging Registration Service) proposed in [7]. In [7] the variability of the 
Imaging Registration Service is documented in a feature model. Hence, we followed 
the approach described in [15] to extract the variability information from the feature 
model. We chose the variability model proposed in [7] because it explicitly refers to 
roles and uses views as role-specific information sets.  
 
Fig. 9. OVM Example with role-specific views based on ACHER et al. (cf. [7]) 
5.2 Z-Specification – Variability of Imaging Registration Service 
The example in Fig. 9 can be specified using the proposed Z-specification. Based on 
Fig. 7, we assign the elements of Fig. 9 to the sets of the Z-specification in Fig. 10. For 
the sake of brevity, we omitted the full specification of the example in this paper. A 
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more detailed specification that contains the complete assignment of OVM elements 
from Fig. 9 to the elements of our Z-specification is available at http://goo.gl/FmwgdQ.  
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MAN_VP = {"Authentification VP", "Grid Deployment Node VP", "Grid Deployment", "OS VP",  
"Processor VP", "CPU VP"} 
OPT_VP = {"Linux VP", "Library Required VP"} 
VARIANT = {"Kerberos", "Password", "SSLAuth", "Authentification", "OS", "File Size Limit", "Proces-
sor", …, "Sc. Linux", "Linux", "Windows", "GPU", "CPU", "x32", "x64", "Matlab"} 
MAN = {"Authentification" ↦ "Grid Deployment Node VP", "OS" ↦ "Grid Deployment Node VP", …", 
"Grid Deployment Node" ↦ "Grid Deployment", "CPU" ↦ "VP Processor"} 
OPT = {"File Size Limit" ↦ "Grid Deployment Node VP", … "GPU" ↦ "VP Processor"} 
ALTGROUP = {("Kerberos", "Password", "SSLAuth") ↦ (1,1) ↦ "Authentification VP"), .., 
("x32", "x64") ↦ (1,1) ↦ ("CPU VP")} 
REQUIRES_V_VP = {"Authentification" ↦ "Authentification VP", …, "Library Required" ↦ "Library Re-
quired VP", "Linux" ↦ "Linux VP", "OS" ↦ "OS VP", "CPU" ↦ "CPU VP"} 
REQUIRES_VP_V = {"Authentification VP" ↦ "Authentification", " …, "Linux VP" ↦ "Linux",} 
EXCLUDES_V_V= {"Matlab" ↦ "Sc.Linux", "Sc.Linux" ↦ "Matlab"} 
Fig. 10. Z-Specification of OVM Example (excerpt) 
5.3 Access Controlled Variability of Imaging Registration Service 
To specify access to different objects using RBAC, we introduce NAME as an abstract 
data type. The elements of this data type are considered unique. Hence, we use a set of 
users specified in line 1 of Fig. 11. The set of roles is based on [7]. According to RBAC, 
the operation AssignUser(user, role: NAME) links a user to a specified role. In our 
example, the application of this operation can result in the user to role mapping speci-
fied in line 3 of Fig. 11. Due to space limitations, the members of the set 
‘OPERATIONS’ contain the operations specified in Section 4.2. Further operations 
need to be defined to make full use of the specification. 
In RBAC, a permission is a three-tuple of an object, an operation, and a role. Defin-
ing a permission in our setting requires to call the GrantPermission2(objects: 𝔽NAME; 
operation, role: NAME) operation. This is a slight modification to the original 
GrantPermission [9] operation, because it takes a set of objects as input instead of only 
one object per operation call. Hence, GrantPermission2 creates an (object, operation) 
permission pair for each member of objects and assigns each pair to role, if and only if 
role is known to the RBAC system. In Fig. 12 the call to GrantPermission2 in line 1 
enables the role -Grid Node Expert- to read all elements of the set ‘OBJECTS’. Hence, 
all elements of the variability model (Fig. 9) can be read. Furthermore, the role -Grid 
Node Expert- is allowed to add and remove mandatory variation points from the model. 
In our example, the user Alice has this role and can therefore execute these operations. 
In contrast, adding and removing optional variation points is not permitted for this role. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
U = {"Alice", "Helen", "Bob"} 
R = {"Grid Node Expert", "Image Expert", "Security Expert"} 
UA = {("Grid Node Expert", "Alice"), ("Image Expert", "Helen"), ("Security Expert", "Bob")} 
OPERATIONS = {addManVP,…, removeManVP } 
OBJECTS = {MAN_VP, OPT_VP, VARIANT, MAN OPT, AlTGROUP, EXCLUDES_V_V, 
EXCLUDES_V_VP, EXCLUDES_VP_V, EXCLUDES_VP_VP, REQUIRES_V_V, 
REQUIRES_V_VP, REQUIRES_VP_V, REQUIRES_VP_VP} 
Fig. 11. Specification of users, roles, operations applicable to OVM objects 
5.4 Access Controlled Variability of Imaging Registration Service with Views 
A view contains one or more role-specific information sets. In order to comply with 
this understanding of role-specific views, it is sufficient to retrieve a subset of the com-
plete set of variability information. In our setting, executing RolePermissions(role: 
NAME; result:2 PERMS) (cf. [9]) would result in a role-specific information set, if and 
only if the role is known and has permissions assigned. Because a permission aggre-
gates an object and an operation that a role is allowed to execute on that object.  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
GrantPermission2(OBJECTS, read, "Grid Node Expert") 
GrantPermission2(MAN_VP, add_Variation_Point, "Grid Node Expert") 
GrantPermission2(MAN_VP, remove_Variation_Point, "Grid Node Expert") 
GrantPermission2((("Kerberos","Password","SSLAuth")↦(1,1)↦("Authentification VP")), readAltGroup, 
"Security Expert") 
GrantPermission2((("Kerberos",”Password","SSLAuth") ↦(1,1)↦("Authentification VP")),  
writeAltGroup, "Security Expert") 
GrantPermission2(("Matlab" ↦ "Library Required VP"), readOptDep, "Image Expert") 
GrantPermission2(("Matlab" ↦ "Library Required VP"), writeOptDep, "Image Expert") 
GrantPermission2(("GPU" ↦ "Processor VP"), read, "Image Expert") 
Fig. 12. Specification of permissions based on objects, operations, and roles 
The execution of the operation RolePermissions for the role -Grid Node Expert-, returns 
all permissions for that role, which are denoted on column two of Table 1. Apparently, 
the results denoted in column 2 (Result) would contain the proper (object, operation) 
pairs. We use (‘OBJECTS’, read) as an abbreviation for (obj1, read) … (objn, read). 
The same applies to ‘MAN_VP’, add/remove_Variation_Point. 
Table 1. Retrieval of role-specific information subset 
 Call to Operation Result 
1 
2 
3 
RolePermissions(“Grid Node Expert”) (OBJECTS, read)  
(MAN_VP, add_Variation_Point) 
(MAN_VP, remove_Variation_Point) 
 
5.5 Example Discussion and Summary 
Executing certain operations (e.g. removeManVP) on a concrete variability model (cf. 
Fig. 10) can have multiple side effects w.r.t. its well-formedness, as well as to its se-
mantic correctness. To preserve the well-formedness of a concrete variability model, 
we specified certain preconditions for removeManVP. On the semantic level removing 
a variation point has wide-ranging consequences because removing a variation point is 
understood as narrowing the amount of configuration choices. Thus, a decision about 
the variants and constraints that are potentially related to his variation point needs to be 
made prior to its removal. Specific roles in an engineering process have the necessary 
responsibilities and the skill set to execute this removal operation. In our example a 
variation point can only be removed if it is not part of a variability dependency and a 
constraint. Consequently, a specific removal strategy is implied that may not be suitable 
for all roles. From this it follows that implementations of certain operations that manip-
ulate a concrete variability model can also be role-specific. For instance if a product 
manager removes a variation point and the related variants, it is expected that this role 
is aware of the consequences. In contrast, if a technical engineer executes the same 
operation it is not guaranteed that he has assessed the consequences of this operation. 
This issue is not specific to removeManVP. Furthermore, this issue also applies to other 
operations and is variability modeling language independent.  
We demonstrated that a concrete variability model can be represented by our Z-
specification (Section 5.2). We illustrated how access control can be realized by apply-
ing the concepts of RBAC directly on the elements of the example variability model 
(Section 5.3). In addition, we pointed out how access controlled role-specific infor-
mation sets (views) can be derived by applying RBAC operations (Section 5.4). The 
application of our approach showed that the requirements (Section 3) for establishing 
role-based access control in viewpoint-oriented variability management have been met. 
6 Related Work  
Multiple areas of research are relevant to our proposed approach. BATORY [17] uses 
grammars and propositional formulas to formally specify feature models. MANNION 
[18] uses first order logic to formally represent a product line model and to validate the 
product line. SCHOBBENS et al. [19] present an overview on different formalizations of 
feature models. SUN et al. [11] provide a Z-based specification for feature models. This 
specification documents the semantic aspects of the tree structure of feature models by 
recognizing different kind of parent and child relations between features. In contrast to 
our work, operations on features are not considered. A Z-specification for non-at-
tributed feature models is also provided in YE and LIN [12]. YE and ZHANG [13]  
propose a Z-specification for software product line evolution. BENAVIDES uses a Z-
based specification for attributed feature models in the layered FAMA-Framework [14] 
in order to reason about attributed feature models. These works do not make the con-
nection between access control and the provided specification. Because of the concep-
tual difference between the used feature modeling languages and the OVM, the pro-
posed Z-specifications cannot be reused in our setting. MUTHIG and SCHROETER [20] 
propose a controlling of access to feature information during engineering in software 
product line organizations. The work in [20] focusses on access control for feature in-
formation and not on variability information represented as features. Furthermore, this 
work demonstrates a conceptual integration of RBAC and feature information.  
Multiple different access control models have been discussed and studied in the lit-
erature. LAMPSON [21] introduces the concept of an access control matrix that can be 
implemented by access control lists [22]. The access control matrix proposed in [21] 
does not explicitly recognize roles and is hence not suitable for our approach. Task-
based authorization by THOMAS and SANDHU [23] focusses on data integrity from an 
organizational and sociological perspective. This access control model is too high level 
and thus not suitable for controlling access to variability information. A spatial ap-
proach to access control was proposed by BULLOCK et al [24]. Because of the coarse 
level of access control, this approach is not suitable without modification. RBAC is 
based on the work of FERRAIOLO et al. [25] and lays the foundation for other access 
control models. Team-based Access Control (TMAC) by THOMAS [26] is an applica-
tion of RBAC in a collaborative environment. GEORGIADIS et al. [27] propose an ex-
tension of TMAC that uses context information to activate permissions.  
7 Summary and Outlook 
In this paper, we proposed a solution for the general problem of access control to vari-
ability information in a specific setting. Part of this setting is the Orthogonal Variability 
Model (OVM) and the Role-based Access Control (RBAC) model. Therefore, the 
OVM was integrated with RBAC on a conceptual and a formal level. Furthermore, it 
was demonstrated how views can be applied in a RBAC setting. The applicability of 
our approach to the existing body of knowledge was demonstrated by an example taken 
from the literature. Furthermore, we briefly discussed the potentially wide-ranging ef-
fects of operations on a variability model. Thereby, we demonstrated why access con-
trol of variability information is important for holistic variability management and 
hence for preventing unwanted change of variability information. Our approach can be 
generalized to support other variability modeling languages, such as the different fea-
ture model dialects discussed in [19]. In order to do so, a Z-specification for the selected 
feature modeling dialect is required that specifies the elements and the operations that 
are allowed on the corresponding feature models. Moreover, the relation between fea-
ture model elements and RBAC elements need to be defined, as well as the relation 
between RBAC operations and feature model operations. 
This work is part of a broader research agenda. In the next step, we strive to extend 
our solution to the base-artefact to variability relation layer, as well as to the base-arti-
fact layer. Thereby, we aim at a complete integration of access control and views across 
all three variability management layers. We also plan to investigate the challenges 
ahead that result from scenarios in which inconsistent access control information on the 
different layers are present. To further evaluate our proposed approach, we plan to im-
plement our solution in our variability modeling tool proposed in [28]. The extended 
version of this tool is planned to be applied in an industrial setting with our partners 
from the German automotive industry.  
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